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Subjects were exposed to a word-picture association training phase in which each 
of 2 arbitrary nonsense syllables printed in blue and red font, respectively, were 
paired with either sexual or aversive photographic images. Subjects were then ex-
posed to an equivalence training procedure that led to the formation of 2 3-mem-
ber equivalence relations, each containing 1 of the 2 nonsense syllables in their 
respective color fonts, and 2 novel nonsense syllables in black font. in effect, equiv-
alence class 1 (blue) was associated with sexual images, while equivalence class 2 
(red) was associated with aversive images. Subjects were then exposed to a 2-block 
test in which sexual and aversive images and all members of the trained equiva-
lence relations, presented in black font, were employed. in 1 block, subjects were 
instructed to produce responses that were compatible with their laboratory histo-
ry. Specifically, subjects were instructed to produce the same operant response on 
a computer keyboard upon the presentation of both sexual images and members 
of equivalence class 1 (blue), and to produce another common response upon the 
presentation of aversive images and members of equivalence class 2 (red). in the 
second block of the test the instructions were juxtaposed such that subjects were 
required to produce common responses to members of classes that were not previ-
ously associated with one another (e.g., sexual images and members of equiva-
lence class 2, red). Differences in the fluency of performances across both blocks 
of the final test were sensitive to subjects’ relational and conditioning histories. 
That is, subjects produced significantly more correct responses during block 1 of 
the test compared to block 2. Such findings lay the foundation for the development 
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of functionally understood behavioral tests and provide a functional-analytic 
model of the widely used implicit Association Test.
the theoretical and technological basis for the development of 
functionally understood implicit behavioral tests has been available for 
the past 15 years, although this research has not been capitalized on until 
recently (see roche, ruiz, o’riordan, & Hand, 2005 for a chapter-length 
review). Specifically, several behavioral studies have employed the concept 
of stimulus equivalence to develop implicit tests of behavioral history. By 
implicit, we mean that the contingencies that control responding in the 
test are not verbally discriminable by the subject (i.e., they are outside 
conscious awareness). rather, the contingencies lie largely outside the 
experimental preparation, which serves only as a current context to bring 
pre-experimentally established behavior to bear. Such a test allows the 
researcher to glean specific information about a subject’s history without 
running the risk of producing experimental demand, social desirability, 
or forms of counter-control through the use of explicit questionnaires or 
interview methods.
the exciting possibility of developing implicit behavioral tests based 
on the concept of stimulus equivalence stems from the crucial finding 
that subjects’ personal and social histories interfere with the formation of 
specific equivalence relations in the laboratory. in a seminal study, Watt, 
Keenan, Barnes and cairns (1991) used a simple stimulus equivalence 
paradigm to take advantage of the fact that people in Northern ireland 
often respond to each other’s names as indicative of religious background. 
their study employed stimuli representative of catholic and Protestant 
names and symbols and involved training subjects to relate them in a 
manner inconsistent with their social histories. During equivalence testing, 
all of the english subjects correctly matched the catholic names with the 
Protestant symbols, but 12 of the 19 Northern irish subjects chose a novel 
Protestant name in the presence of the Protestant symbols, thereby failing 
to form equivalence relations. these findings strongly suggested that the 
social contingencies operating in Northern ireland interfered with the 
establishment of equivalence relations in the laboratory. More specifically, 
the equivalence test required Northern irish subjects to juxtapose names 
and symbols in a manner that was countercultural for this group of 
subjects. thus, it would appear that a derived relations paradigm may be 
used successfully to assess the social knowledge of participants without 
alerting them to the nature of the task.
the stimulus equivalence-based approach has also been employed to 
discriminate anxious from nonanxious patients (leslie, tierney, robinson, 
Keenan, Watt, & Barnes, 1993), develop a diagnostic tool to identify children 
who have been sexually abused (McGlinchey, Keenan, & Dillenburger, 2000; 
see also Keenan, McGlinchey, Fairhurst, & Dillenberger, 2000), and to identify 
child sex offenders as a distinct social group within a larger population 
of non–sex offenders (see roche et al., 2005). other researchers have used 
the equivalence paradigm to assess subjects’ attitudes toward themselves 
(Barnes, lawlor, Smeets, & roche, 1995; Merwin & Wilson, 2005), toward 
sexually explicit stimuli (Grey & Barnes, 1996), as well as attitudes of North 
Americans toward Middle easterners (see Dixon, Dymond, rehfeldt, roche, & 
Zlomke, 2003).
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interestingly, the foregoing equivalence-based approach to implicit testing 
appears to be functionally similar to the eponymous implicit Association test 
(iAt; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998). the iAt is a psychometric-style 
test used to determine what its creators call unconscious bias (e.g., regarding 
race, age, gender). Specifically, a subject responds to a series of items that 
may be classified into one of four categories. two of the categories usually 
represent a concept (e.g., flowers and insects), while two further categories 
usually represent a value-laden attribute (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant). 
Subjects are asked to respond rapidly with a right-hand key press to items 
representing one concept and one attribute (e.g., insects and pleasant), and 
with a left-hand key press to items from the remaining two categories (e.g., 
flowers and unpleasant). Subjects then perform a second task in which the 
requirements are switched (e.g., flowers and pleasant stimuli share a response 
and insects and unpleasant stimuli share a response). the iAt records the 
latencies and accuracies of responses to these two tasks. these measures 
are interpreted in terms of association strengths. that is, it is assumed that 
subjects respond more rapidly and accurately when the concept and attribute 
sharing the same response are pre-experimentally strongly associated (e.g., 
flowers and pleasant) than when they are weakly associated (e.g., insects and 
pleasant). in contrast to the vast number of explicit attitude measures, the iAt 
is thought capable of overcoming experimental demand characteristics and 
to make it difficult for subjects to fake responses in comparison with explicit 
tests such as questionnaires (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Kim, 2003).
Despite numerous replications attesting to the reliability of the iAt as 
a measure of unconscious cognitions, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
regarding its core processes (e.g., rothermund & Wentura, 2004). Specifically, 
the claim that the test measures unconscious (implicit) bias is made in the 
absence of empirical data (Karpsinki & Hilton, 2001; Steffens & Plewe, 2001). 
Furthermore, while the original creators of the test make claims regarding 
its validity, others have called it into question (e.g., De Houwer, 2001, 2006). 
in spite of a lack of clarity over what exactly the iAt measures and what 
researchers mean by the term “implicit” (De Houwer, 2006), psychologists 
continue to apply the iAt from within a poorly understood social-cognitive 
paradigm (see Fiedler, Messner, & Bluemke, 2006). After an extensive review 
of the literature, Fiedler et al. (2006) reported the distinct absence of a 
testable model underlying the iAt. the current research, therefore, served 
two purposes. the first was to examine a competing contingency approach to 
implicit testing for social and personal history. the second was to model the 
iAt test format and to show that it can be understood in terms of a competing 
contingencies account.
A detailed overview of the current competing contingencies approach 
to implicit testing was provided by roche et al. (2005) and was based on a 
preliminary empirical demonstration of the model developed by roche, 
ruiz and Hand (2003). roche et al. (2005) argued that the iAt is a measure 
of subjects’ fluency with the relevant verbal categories and their degree 
of experience at juxtaposing members of those verbal categories (i.e., the 
extent of contextual control over the categorization of the relevant social/
verbal stimuli). More specifically, the four verbal categories employed in a 
typical iAt (two concepts and two attributes) are conceived as equivalence 
classes containing everyday words and objects. it is argued that higher-order 
equivalence relations (see Wulfert, Greenway, & Dougher, 1994) or relations 
GAViN et Al.430
between equivalence relations (see Stewart, Barnes-Holmes, roche, & Smeets, 
2002) often obtain in the natural environment. For instance, for a black racist 
individual the verbal classes White and Bad might participate in a further 
higher-order equivalence relation that we may call “things i don’t like.” the 
iAt works by measuring the ease with which a common response function 
(e.g., press the left key) can be established for two or more members of this 
higher-order equivalence relation compared with members of different and 
unrelated equivalence relations (e.g., White and Good). From this perspective, 
the iAt functions as a subtle or implicit test for derived relations (or for the 
purpose of a convenient acronym; an implicit relational test; irt).
to test the foregoing idea, 15 subjects were first exposed to a respondent 
conditioning procedure in which each of two nonsense syllables, printed in blue 
and red font, was paired with a sexual or aversive visual image, respectively. 
Subjects were then exposed to an equivalence training procedure that led to 
the formation of two three-member equivalence relations, each containing 
one of the conditioned stimuli as A stimuli. Subjects were then exposed to 
an equivalence-based iAt-type test consisting of sexual and aversive images 
and all members of the trained equivalence relations (presented in black 
font). in one block of the test, subjects were required to produce a common 
response to members of the same derived equivalence relations, while in 
another block of the test, they were required to produce a common response 
to two members of distinct derived equivalence relations. it was expected 
that subjects would produce more correct responses when common response 
functions were established for stimuli from the same equivalence relation, 
compared with when these response functions were established for stimuli 
from different equivalence relations.
Method
Subjects
Fifteen (6 male and 9 female) subjects aged 18–62 years, all acquaintances 
of the female experimenter, participated in the current study. Subjects were 
informed that they would be participating in a four-phase word-association 
test, which would take approximately 1 hr to complete.
Apparatus
All four phases of the experiment were presented to subjects on 
an Apple iMac 400 MHz computer with a 15-in. monitor. Stimulus 
presentations were controlled by using the software package Psyscope 
(cohen, MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993), which also recorded all 
responses. two colored abstract shapes and 12 photographic images taken 
from the international Affective Picture System (iAPS; lang, Bradley, 
& cuthbert, 1999) were employed during the conditioning phase. the 
photographs used as sexual images were classified in the iAPS under the 
headings “romance,” “erotic couple, and “couple.” the photographs used 
as aversive images were classified under the headings “roaches,” “Attack 
dog,” “Disabled,” “electric chair,” “Distressed fem,” and “Attack.” the 
images used corresponded to the slide numbers 4599, 4601, 4606, 4608, 
4609, 4623, 1274, 1525, 3300, 6020, 6311, and 6510. Finally, six nonsense 
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syllables were employed as stimuli during the equivalence phase. these 
were ler, cug, Mau, Vek, Paf, and rog. these will be referred to by using 
the alphanumerics A1, B1, c1, A2, B2, and c2.
Procedure
General experimental sequence. the current experiment consisted of three 
phases. Phases 1 through 3 were presented consecutively on the computer. each 
phase was completed one at a time, and subjects were instructed to contact the 
experimenter at the end of each phase. the experimenter then initiated the 
next phase manually. Subjects sat comfortably at a standard computer desk 
and viewed the computer screen at a distance of approximately 70 cm and at 
eye level. Phase 1 consisted of word-picture association training and lasted 
approximately 10 min. Phase 2 consisted of equivalence training and testing 
during which subjects used a computer mouse to make choices between 
comparison stimuli on each of a series of baseline conditional discrimination 
tasks and on probes for derived relations during the equivalence test. Phase 
3 consisted of the competing contingencies test and took approximately 10 
min to complete.
Phase 1. in Phase 1, subjects were exposed to a word-picture association-
training procedure in which a respondent conditioning preparation was 
used. that is, two arbitrary nonsense syllables (A1: ler, A2: Vek) were paired 
with sexual and aversive photographic images, respectively. the nonsense 
syllable paired with the sexual images was blue, while that paired with the 
aversive images was red. For 5 of the subjects these color associations were 
reversed (i.e., ler was red, Vek was blue), but for clarity we will refer only to 
the original color association configuration.
Subjects were presented with the following instructions on-screen after 
being seated in front of the computer:
in a moment some words and images will appear on this screen
Your task is to look at these items carefully and to remember 
what you see
it iS VerY iMPortANt tHAt YoU coNtiNUe to WAtcH tHe 
ScreeN At All tiMeS
After each picture has been presented you will be required to 
press the space bar on the computer to continue. Please make 
sure you know where the space bar is before you begin.
reMeMBer – it iS VerY iMPortANt tHAt YoU PlAY cloSe 
AtteNtioN to WHAt iS HAPPeNiNG oN tHe coMPUter 
ScreeN.
if you have any questions please ask them now.
When you are ready please click the mouse button.
All conditioning trials were presented on the computer screen against 
a black background. A trial began with the presentation of one of the two 
nonsense syllables appearing in the center of the screen for a period of 2 s 
followed by an interval of 1 s wherein the screen remained blank. After the 1 
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s interval the relevant picture appeared in the center of the screen for 4 s. one 
second after the onset of the image, the nonsense syllable was re-presented in 
the top left of the screen for the remainder of the trial (i.e., 3 s). in effect, the 
word-picture association phase employed both a trace and a simultaneous 
conditioning procedure. At the end of each trial the phrase “Press the space 
bar” appeared in the center of the screen in 20-point times font and remained 
until the subject pressed the space bar. the space bar press functioned as an 
observing response that initiated the subsequent trial.
there were 10 conditioning trials for each of the two word-picture 
associations, with no more than two consecutive exposures to either 
association. trials were separated by an intertrial interval of 15 s.
Phase 2. on completion of the word-picture association-training phase, 
subjects were immediately exposed to Phase 2, which consisted of equivalence 
training and testing. training was designed to lead to the formation of two 
three-member equivalence relations, each containing one of the two nonsense 
syllables used during Phase 1 as A stimuli, and two novel nonsense syllables.
there were two baseline conditional discrimination-training tasks, 
composed of four matching-to-sample tasks. training was conducted by 
using a linear training method (i.e., A1-B1, B1-c1 and A2-B2, B2-c2). Prior to 
training, subjects were presented with brief instructions requesting them to 
use the computer mouse to click on the comparison stimulus they believed 
to be correct. tasks were presented in a quasi-random order in blocks of 
16 trials (i.e., four times each with no more than two successive exposures 
to any task). Subjects matched the comparison stimuli (e.g., cug, Paf) to the 
sample (e.g., ler, Vek) by clicking on the comparison of their choice using the 
computer mouse and cursor. All choices were followed by corrective feedback 
delivered by the computer (i.e., the word correct or Wrong appearing in the 
center of the screen in red 20-point font for 1.5 s). Feedback informed subjects 
as to whether their choice was correct or incorrect. Subjects were exposed 
to successive blocks of training until they responded correctly on 15 of the 
16 tasks in a single block (i.e., 93.75% correct). the training tasks were as 
follows: A1-B1 (B2), A2-B1 (B2), B1-c1 (c2), and B2-c2 (B1), where the stimuli in 
parentheses indicate incorrect choices.
After reaching criterion during training, subjects were exposed 
immediately to a block of 16 testing tasks presented in quasi-random order 
(i.e., four exposures to each of the four tasks, with no more than two successive 
exposures to any task). the testing tasks were A1-c1 (c2), A2-c2 (c1), c1-A1 
(A2), and c2-A2 (A1), where the stimuli in parentheses indicate incorrect 
choices. Subjects did not receive corrective feedback during this testing 
period. the testing proceeded, without a break, in blocks of 16 trials until the 
subject reached the 93.75% correct response criterion in a single block or until 
16 blocks had been administered. During testing, subjects were expected to 
match A1 to c1, c1 to A1, A2 to c2, and c2 to A2, thereby demonstrating 
stimulus equivalence (see Barnes, 1994; Fields, Adams, Verhave, & Newman, 
1990; Sidman, 1986).
Subjects were required to pass the testing phase in order to proceed to 
Phase 3. All 15 subjects in the current study met the criterion in both the 
training and testing stages of Phase 2.
Phase 3. in Phase 3, subjects were exposed to a discrimination test 
consisting of sexual and aversive images, and all members of the trained 
equivalence relations (presented in black font) as stimuli. recall that in Phase 
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1, A1 (presented in blue) was paired with sexual images and A2 (presented 
in red) was paired with aversive images. this phase relied on the well-
established transfer-of-functions effect (see Barnes, 1994) to ensure that all 
remaining class members acquired the relevant color functions. While the 
derived transfer of color functions to the B and c stimuli was not explicitly 
tested, it was fundamental to observing a difference in response fluencies 
across the testing blocks during this phase.
Prior to exposure to this phase, subjects were presented with the following 
on-screen instructions based on those used by Greenwald et al. (1998).
in a moment some items will appear on this screen. Your task is 
to first look at the item and then press either the Z key on the left 
or the M key button on the right of the keyboard in front of you. 
look now to make sure you know where they are. Use the labels 
at the top of the screen to help you decide which key to press.
Keep in mind:
Keep your index fingers on the left and right buttons to 
enable rapid response.
two labels at the top will tell you which words go with 
each button
each word has a correct classification.
Please try to go fast.
expect to make a few mistakes because of going fast. 
that’s oK.
 if you have any questions please ask the experimenter now. click 
any key when ready to start
Further instructions presented on the top left and right of the screen 
during all tasks varied, depending on the task block being presented (see 
Figure 1). the same instructions remained on-screen for the entire duration 
of a task block and changed only at the beginning of the second task block.
Press left for  
Blue and Sexual
Press right for 
Red and Aversive
Press left for  
Red and Sexual
Press right for 
Blue and Aversive
Cug Cug
Press left for  
Blue and Sexual
Press right for 
Red and Aversive
Press left for  
Red and Sexual
Press right for 
Blue and Aversive
Paf Paf
Figure 1. Examples of tasks presented to subjects during the Implicit Relational Test in 
Phase 3.
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Subjects were exposed to a total of 180 trials presented in two task blocks 
(i.e., 90 trials in each block). the order in which these blocks were presented 
was randomized across subjects. each of the blocks consisted of four task 
types, each of which involved the presentations of one of the following 
stimulus types in the center of the computer screen: sexual images, aversive 
images, class 1 stimuli (A1, B1, or c1), and class 2 stimuli (A2, B2, or c2). 
these four tasks were presented once each in a random order in a block of 
four trials. there were 22 successive presentations of these four-trial blocks 
(i.e., 88 trials) followed by two of the four task types chosen randomly by the 
computer software (i.e., 88 + 2 = 90).
the frequency of presentation of A1, B1, c1, A2, B2, and c2 was equal 
across the first 88 tasks in each block of 90. the same sexual and aversive 
images employed during phase 1 were employed during phase 3. images were 
chosen randomly by the computer software on relevant trials.
During the relationally consistent task block, subjects were required to 
make a left-hand key press (i.e., press the Z key on the computer keyboard) 
upon the presentation of blue and sexual stimuli and to make a right-
hand key press (i.e., press the M key on the computer keyboard) upon the 
presentation of red and aversive stimuli (see Figure 1). in contrast, during 
the relationally inconsistent task block, red and sexual images shared a 
left-hand key press and blue and aversive images shared a right-hand key 
press (see Figure 1). During phase 3, however, all nonsense syllables were 
presented in black, and so any color functions elicited by the B and c stimuli 
were derived by virtue of the transfer-of-functions effect (i.e., B1 and c1 
should have derived “blue” functions, and B2 and c2 should have derived 
“red” functions).
Subjects’ responses were recorded in terms of both accuracy and latency. 
However, in contrast to Greenwald’s (1998) method of recoding response 
latencies above 3,000 ms as 3,000 ms, trials in the current study were 
limited to 3,000 ms duration. this difference was intended to circumvent the 
problem of devising and negotiating arbitrary statistical procedures designed 
to extract a hypothetical process from the data set. in effect, subjects were 
prevented from responding outside the 3,000 ms time frame by the cessation 
of the trial and the presentation of the subsequent trial. A failure to respond 
within the 3,000 ms response window was recorded as an incorrect response, 
and the response latency was recorded as 3,000 ms. response times were 
recorded from the trial onset to the first emitted response on the computer 
keyboard, regardless of whether the response was correct.
results
All 15 subjects passed both equivalence training and testing during 
Phase 2 (see table 1). the criterion for passing training and testing was set at 
15 correct responses in a block of 16 trials. three subjects passed training on 
the first block of 16 trials, while 1 subject required 10 blocks to pass training. 
the mean number of blocks of training required to reach criterion was 4.67. 
Seven subjects passed the equivalence test on the first block. one subject 
required 12 blocks of testing to reach criterion. the mean number of testing 
blocks required to reach criterion was 2.93.
For the purpose of data analysis, response times and accuracies were left 
in their raw state and not transformed in any way.
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Table 1
Correct Responses for Each Training and Testing Block During Phase 2
Subject
Number of Blocks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1: Train 15/16 16/16
1: Test 16/16
2: Train 9/16 16/16
2: Test 16/16
3: Train 12/16 14/16 14/16 16/16
3: Test 16/16
4: Train 12/16 7/16 8/16 12/16 9/16 12/16 12/16 13/16 16/16
4: Test 16/16
5: Train 10/16 13/16 16/16
5: Test 16/16
6: Train 12/16 14/16 14/16 16/16
6: Test 11/16 14/16 16/16
7: Train 8/16 7/16 11/16 14/16 16/16
7: Test 14/16 16/16
8: Train 8/16 7/16 12/16 9/16 6/16 9/16 12/16 13/16 14/16 16/16
8: Test 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 0/16 3/16 16/16
9: Train 9/16 10/16 9/16 10/16 13/16 13/16 14/16 14/16 16/16
9: Test 14/16 16/16
10: Train 10/16 13/16 14/16 16/16
10: Test 8/16 9/16 7/16 11/16 6/16 3/16 11/16 13/16 16/16
11: Train 16/16
11: Test 16/16
12: Train 16/16
12: Test 16/16
13: Train 16/16
13: Test 14/16 14/16 16/16
14: Train 11/16 11/16 13/16 14/16 14/16 16/16
14: Test 14/16 14/16 16/16
15: Train 4/16 7/16 12/16 4/16 5/16 5/16 11/16 11/16 16/16
15: Test 12/16 12/16 16/16
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in Phase 3 all subjects successfully completed the required 180-trial 
discrimination test. Subjects’ total number of correct responses was calculated 
for both relationally consistent (M = 76.5) and relationally inconsistent (M = 
54.6) tasks (see Figure 2). there was considerable variance observed across 
subjects’ total number of correct responses on the relationally consistent and 
relationally inconsistent tasks.
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Relationally Consistent Relationally Inconsistent
Figure 2. Individual subject response accuracies for the Implicit Relational Test in Phase 3.
Subject 8 scored well below chance levels on both the consistent (29) 
and the inconsistent (12) tasks. Seven additional subjects (S2, S3, S5, S6, S11, 
S12, and S15) also scored at or below chance levels on the inconsistent tasks. 
However, all but 1 of the 15 subjects (i.e., S8) scored above chance levels on 
the consistent tasks, with the lowest of these scores being 60 of a total of 90. 
it is important that 13 of the 15 subjects responded with greater accuracy on 
the relationally consistent task block.
An inferential statistical analysis showed that the total correct responses 
differed significantly across the test blocks in Phase 3 (t = 5.129, df = 14, 
p = 0.000). the magnitude of the difference across test blocks in terms of 
the variance in scores within test blocks (i.e., the eta-squared statistic) was 
0.652, indicating a large effect size (see cohen, 1994). response latencies, 
however, did not differ significantly between the consistent (M = 1.128 s) and 
inconsistent (M = 1.176 s) task blocks (t = 0.099, df = 14, p = 0.75). the effect 
size was also small (eta-squared statistic = 0.001).
Discussion
the current implicit relations test was clearly sensitive to the laboratory 
conditioning and relational histories of the subjects. More specifically, 
both the color-images associations and the equivalence class membership 
configurations were determined arbitrarily by the experimenters. Nevertheless, 
response accuracy, in a test that required subjects to make common responses 
to two stimulus items, was reliably enhanced or retarded by this laboratory-
controlled history. thus, the effect demonstrated here was clearly under 
experimental control. this effect can be explained only by the congruent and 
competing contingencies brought to bear during the relationally consistent 
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and relationally inconsistent bocks of the test. Such a finding suggests that 
this procedure can be used to assess stimulus associations and equivalence 
class membership of stimuli in a subject’s preexperimental history. Moreover, 
the procedure is sufficiently subtle that it is doubtful that subjects were 
aware of the purpose of the critical test (Phase 3). indeed, none of the subjects 
was able to report an awareness of the purpose of the test. in other words, 
subjects were not able to tact the conditioning and relational contingencies 
controlling their final test performance.
these findings would appear to provide a clear account of the iAt 
effect in terms of a parsimonious framework without the need to appeal 
to hypothetical mediating constructs such as attitudes and unconscious 
cognitions (see Greenwald et al., 1998). this implicit relational test model of 
the iAt effect employed laboratory-generated stimuli and laboratory-created 
stimulus functions. thus, this study represents a first step in constructing a 
testable model of the core processes involved in a very popular psychological 
test that has previously been difficult to explain (see Fiedler et al., 2006). 
our results support the view proposed by roche et al. (2005) that in the iAt, 
personal and verbal/cultural histories interfere with responding to relations 
that juxtapose culturally relevant stimuli in a countercultural fashion.
one previous study, to our knowledge, has been published that attempted 
to generate an account of the iAt in terms of respondent processes and 
the juxtaposition of unrelated stimulus classes in the iAt test format. 
Specifically, Mitchell, Anderson, & lovibond (2003) taught a group of subjects 
the “meanings” of four nonwords. two of these meanings were affectively 
positive, and two were affectively negative. the researchers found evidence 
for the transfer of affect in an iAt. that is, the nonwords given pleasant 
meanings in training were more easily categorized with pleasant than with 
unpleasant personality characteristics, compared with nonwords given 
unpleasant meanings.
respondent processes no doubt play an important role in the development 
of stimulus classes whose structure can be measured with tests such as that 
used here. However, the current research extends this view to include the 
process of derived relational responding. the inclusion of this process in a 
model of the iAt increases its ecological validity by directly addressing the 
issue of verbal categories or semantic relations and their widely accepted, 
though unspecified role in the iAt (see Greenwald et al., 1998).
one important feature of the current data is the clear visibility of 
individual subject effects in Phase 3. in other words, the test effect was 
established for most members of the subject population. Specifically, 13 of 
the 15 subjects responded with greater accuracy on the relationally consistent 
task block. Moreover, 8 of the subjects responded at or below chance levels 
on the inconsistent task block, while 3 further subjects responded only 
marginally above chance level on this block. thus, a clear and replicated 
effect was observed for most subjects in the experiment.
No effect was observed for response times with the current test method. 
However, it is important to understand that this outcome was expected, given 
that we did not employ an iAt-style statistical methodology. More specifically, 
the iAt adopts various scoring algorithms (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; 
see also Devos and Banaji, 2005) that mathematically derive psychometric 
scores from an otherwise clear response time and accuracy (i.e., fluency) 
pattern. in particular, Greenwald and his collaborators employ a response 
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correction technique that produces a hybrid iAt score combining response 
time and response accuracy in ways not functionally understood. the 
procedure involves providing corrective feedback after incorrect responses 
and requiring a correct response to terminate each trial. thus, response times 
reflect the time taken to respond in the first instance plus the additional time 
taken to emit the second altered response. in effect, the iAt delivers a time 
penalty for those trials on which an incorrect response is emitted, thereby 
ensuring longer average response times for those tasks that the subject finds 
most difficult (i.e., relationally inconsistent). it is important to understand, 
therefore, that what the iAt reports as a response time is more accurately 
viewed as a procedurally forced and mathematically derived response 
accuracy and latency hybrid measure and not a direct and transparent index 
of either. the use of such statistical scoring techniques (which are constantly 
under revision by Greenwald and colleagues) limit the extent to which the 
controlling features of a subject’s performance can be observed and makes a 
functional analysis of the behavior under analysis ever more difficult. indeed, 
the measurement scales and scoring systems employed in any scientific 
investigation function as rules that bring the scientist’s behavior under 
the control of aspects of the behavior of interest (Johnston & Pennypacker, 
1993). thus, the analytic methodology limits the response variability of the 
scientist. to this extent, the radical behaviorist prefers the inductive method 
(Sidman, 1960) and freedom from the constraints of theory and deduction to 
as great an extent as possible (Skinner, 1950).
Another reason why our purely descriptive approach to data analysis 
failed to yield response time differentials relates to our reluctance to employ 
arbitrary post hoc response time truncation techniques as used in the iAt 
scoring technique. More specific, the iAt is presumed to measure error rates 
across task types more effectively when subjects are under time constraints 
to respond on individual trials. thus, the iAt involves instructing subjects 
to respond as quickly as possible on each trial. Nevertheless, no time limit 
actually is imposed on trials and all response times are recorded, regardless 
of duration. this strategy allows the researcher to consider their data spread 
statistically post hoc and to consider outliers differently from study to study, 
depending on the aims of the research. typically, iAt researchers recode all 
response times greater than 3,000 ms to 3,000 ms and all response times less 
than 300 ms to 300 ms. However, allowing response times of up to 10,000 ms 
may also be permissible (see Devos & Banaji, 2005; Greenwald et al., 2003). 
the current study did not employ any such truncation techniques but relied 
instead on a forced fluency procedure in which speed of responding was 
enforced on a trial-to-trial basis by a finite response window. it is perhaps 
because of this behaviorally controlled time constraint that we observed 
response accuracy differentials where the iAt would fail to see them (i.e., the 
iAt is based on the aforementioned response accuracy/time hybrid measure 
rather than accuracy alone). Furthermore, we failed to observe response time 
differentials where the iAt would typically find them. thus, the current study 
illustrates the benefits of behavioral control over the relevant contingencies 
that produce response differentials across the two task blocks (i.e., relationally 
consistent and relationally inconsistent) of the iAt.
even if response time differentials can be generated by using our derived 
relations model, it remains the case that behavioral measures do not typically 
emphasize response latencies (but see Bentall, Dickins, & Fox, 1993; Spencer 
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& chase, 1996; Steele & Hayes, 1991; Wulfert & Hayes, 1988). this is because 
response latency is subject to a wide range of interpretations. in particular, 
behavior analysts are cautious of reaction times measures, as they may be 
used mistakenly as an explanatory mechanism or as evidence of mediating 
cognitive processes (e.g., attitudes; see Johnston & Pennypacker, 1993; see 
also o’Hora, roche, Barnes-Holmes, & Smeets , 2002; roche, linehan, Ward, 
Dymond & rehfeldt, 2004). thus, the current study emphasized accuracy over 
response time as a measure of the acquisition of the operant discrimination 
tasks presented in the implicit relations test.
in conclusion, the current research demonstrates that it is possible to use 
a competing contingencies approach to generate a functionally understood 
implicit-style test of behavioral history. Moreover, this study has established 
that it is sufficient to establish a limited number of conditioned response 
functions and an appropriate network of derived relations, using a range 
of arbitrary stimuli, to create a laboratory-controlled iAt effect. thus, it 
is now clear that iAt effects may in principle be generated in the absence 
of “unconscious bias” and attitudes, at least as traditionally conceived. of 
course, behaviorally speaking, an attitude may be conceived as a network of 
derived and explicitly reinforced stimulus relations according to which the 
functions of events are transformed (Grey & Barnes, 1996). to this extent the 
current implicit relations test may indeed be said to measure attitudes thus 
defined. What is clear from the current study, however, is that the iAt may 
reveal no more than the organization of an individual’s conditioning and 
verbal history through the use of a competing contingencies test. therefore, 
the current derived relations model builds on the seminal work conducted by 
Watt et al. (1991) in laying the foundation for the development of functionally 
understood implicit tests that can rival the iAt as reliable and valid measures 
of behavioral history.
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